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Abstract
The literature exploring computer-based information system (CBIS)
evaluation has explicated a number of methods for investigating the impact of
systems on organizations. However, while CBIS evaluation methods have been
scrutinized and debated, the assumptions embedded in differing evaluative
approaches have remained largely tacit. Highlighting the ontological (about the
nature of reality) and epistemological (about the nature of valid knowledge)
assumptions of alternative evaluative methods suggests two paradigms for CBIS
evaluation - positivist and interpretive. Positivist CBIS evaluation is characterized
by detachment of evaluator from subject, a priori categorization, and a quest for
generalizable knowledge. Interpretive CBIS evaluation is characterized by
experiential involvement of researcher in subject, an absence of a priori
classification, and a quest for accurate descriptions of particular circumstances.
Recognizing the ontological and epistemological differences between positivist
and interpretive evaluation suggests four propositions useful in improving CBIS
evaluation research. These propositions include acknowledging values, beliefs,
and assumptions implicit in CBIS evaluation, recognizing and discussing
evaluation trade offs, building 'complicated' descriptions of CBISs, and
recognizing the interdependence of positivist and interpretive evaluation
approaches.

An organization implements a computer-based information system (CBIS).
Later, someone asks if the CBIS is a success or failure. Does it contribute to
organizational goals? Should it be maintained, expanded, replaced, or
abandoned?
Recent research suggests that a major obstacle to investment in new
CBISs is the inability to measure and evaluate productivity gains resulting from
such investments (Blacker and Brown, 1988; Strassman, 1985). Controversy over
measuring productivity contributions from new technology has resulted in
increasing skepticism regarding the benefits of CBIS in general (Business Week,
1988), and microcomputers (Bowen, 1986) and office automation (Strassman,
1985; Uttal, 1982) in particular. This controversy over CBIS productivity mandates
a reexamination of CBIS evaluative practice. Specifically, how can we determine
why and when CBISs contribute to managerial productivity?
IS researchers have long recognized the importance and complexity of this
and related questions. As a result, a number of methods for evaluating CBIS have
evolved. However, it is not generally recognized that methods of evaluating CBIS
reflect basic values, beliefs, and assumptions about what constitutes valid
knowledge. While the methods for CBIS evaluation have been scrutinized and
debated (e.g., Hamilton and Chervany, 1981a; Sprague and Carlson, 1982), the
assumptions embedded in differing evaluative approaches have remained largely
tacit. However, the hidden values and assumptions implicit in CBIS evaluation
methods can impede understanding of the benefits and limitations of alternative
evaluation practices (Hirschheim and Smithson, 1988). IS researchers are less
likely to trip over assumptions implicit in evaluative methods if these assumptions
are highlighted, discussed, and debated. The purpose of this paper is to highlight
differing epistemologies used in evaluation, and to relate these epistemological
differences to CBIS evaluation practice.
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One important approach to improving CBIS evaluation has been to
explicate alternative methods of CBIS evaluation (Hamilton and Chervany, 1981a,
198b; Sprague and Carlson, 1982; Srinivasan, 1985), and to delineate differing
paradigmatic approaches to evaluation (Hirschheim and Smithson, 1988).
Another important line of research has examined conditions in which CBISs are
incorporated into organizations (Kling and Iacono, 1984; Markus and Robey,
1988; Zmud and Apple, 1989). These efforts provide a foundation for under-
standing the fundamental relationships between information technology and
organizational change, and for linking theories of evaluation with more general
scientific principles. This paper complements these efforts by explicating the
paradigmatic assumptions of alternative theoretical perspectives of evaluation,
and by linking these assumptions with CBIS evaluation methods.
I. CBIS EVALUATION
CBIS evaluation is herein defined as the process of formally determining
how a CBIS impacts and is impacted by an organization. Several assumptions are
implicit in this definition. First, that a CBIS has been implemented, meaning that
evaluation is a post-implementation activity. Evaluation is therefore identified as
distinct from feasibility analysis (Caddell, 1985) and a priori justification of CBIS
(Bozcany, 1983; Gremillion and Pyburn, 1985). Second, formal processes are
used to evaluate the CBIS. While these formal processes may be qualitative, they
are systematic and not purely impressionistic, off-hand reflections. Third, it is
assumed that organizations both create and are created by CBIS. Evidence
suggests that the process of implementing a CBIS creates complex, often
unanticipated chains of events in organizations (Barley; 1986; Markus and Robey,
1988). These chains of events ultimately mean that organizations create CBISs
and CBISs create organizations. Finally, it is assumed that significant linkages
exist between evaluation methodologies and theoretical models (Markus and
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Robey, 1988; Weick 1984). One's choice of a method is colored by implicit
theoretical values and biases. As a result, the choice of a CBIS evaluative
methodology is also frequently an implicit choice of a theoretical perspective
(since "believing is seeing," Weick, 1979, p. 135).
Why do organizations evaluate CBIS? Research suggests that evaluations
contain dual relevance to organizations 1 . Evaluation is useful in producing valid
knowledge by probing and sensing internal organizational realities (Patton, 1987).
However, evaluation is also an important component of the authority structure of
an organization (Scott, Dornbusch, Busching, and Laing, 1967). As a component
of the organizational authority structure, evaluations play a crucial role in
administering rewards and punishments to organizational actors (Pfeffer, 1978).
The dualistic nature of evaluations causes evaluative processes to both impact
and reflect the more general interplay between rational and political processes in
organizations. As a result, alternative approaches to evaluating CBISs reflect not
only alternative modes and methods of acquiring valid knowledge, but also al-
ternative methods for legitimating political activity (Legge, 1984), for signalling and
symbolizing rationality and competence (Feldman and March, 1981), and for
managing and manipulating organizational actors (Hirschheim and Smithson,
1988).
The role of evaluation in producing valid knowledge can be conceived as
an application of general scientific principles of inquiry and knowledge (Legge,
1984). Kuhn's concept of "paradigm," while the focus of considerable debate, is
useful in delineating differing modes of inquiry used in evaluating CBIS. As
The dual nature of evaluative activity exists regardless of relationships between evaluator and
organization. Academicians, who are relatively independent of the organizations whose systems
they evaluate, are generally concerned about both contributing to the body of research knowledge
and acquiring status, resources, and security within the research community (Whitley, 1984). IS
professionals who evaluate CBISs are generally concerned about both learning the impact of
specific systems and using the evaluation process to further political ends.
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conceived by Kuhn (1970) and expanded by others (e.g., DeMey, 1982; Toulmin,
1972), a paradigm is not a synonym for theory, but rather identifies the mosaic of
theoretical frameworks, methodology, and ideology that comprise a discipline.
Legge, building upon the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), suggests that
choices of evaluation methods follow directly from paradigmatic differences:
A paradigm, as defined by Kuhn (1970) is a set of interrelated
assumptions about the social world which provides a philosophical
and conceptual framework for the systematic study of that world.
These assumptions are ontological (about the nature of reality),
epistemological (about the grounds of knowledge, about how
people know, what they know and what the limits of that knowledge
might be) and methodological (about the methods to be employed
to gain knowledge about reality). The methodological assumptions
essentially are derived from the epistemological, which, in turn, are
derived from the ontological assumptions of the researcher. Hence
any evaluation design derives basically from a particular world view
held by the evaluator (Legge, 1984, p. 74).
Viewing the role of evaluation in producing valid knowledge from the
context of general principles of scientific inquiry suggests two basic methods of
inquiry or "paradigms". Legge identifies the basic paradigms of evaluation as
positivist and interpretive
. These paradigms contain fundamentally differing sets of
values, beliefs and assumptions that are reflected in differing methods,
approaches, and ideologies of CBIS evaluation. While related dichotomies have
been discussed in the CBIS evaluation literature2
,
previous research has not
focused on explicating the assumptions underlying differing evaluative paradigms,
or on the implicit linkages between paradigmatic assumptions and evaluation
methodologies. Such is the intent of this paper.
2 i
Researchers have identified formative versus summative evaluation (Hamilton and Chervany
1981a, 1981b; Meals, 1977), analytical versus interpretive evaluation (Hirschheim and Smithson,
1988), discovery versus testing research (Franz and Robey, 1987), and positivist and process
research (Blacker and Brown, 1983).
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II. THE POSITIVIST AND INTERPRETIVE EVALUATION PARADIGMS
Positivist and interpretive evaluation are both useful in CBIS evaluation.
However, they approach problems with different values, assumptions, and
methods, and provide radically different evaluation results. To more clearly expli-
cate paradigmatic differences, they are presented herein as polar opposites. In
reality however, there is a wide spectrum of approaches to scientific inquiry and
CBIS evaluation, many of which combine paradigmatic elements (Morgan and
Smircich, 1980). Hence, dichotomizing evaluation paradigms represents an
oversimplification. However, by explicating the extremes of different approaches,
and magnifying their differences, a clearer picture emerges of the usefulness of
alternative evaluative paradigms in exploring CBIS impact.
Figure 1 (adapted from Evered and Louis, 1981) summarizes the positivist
and interpretive modes of inquiry. The vertical axis describes the paradigm
(positivist and interpretive) while the horizontal axis defines paradigmatic
characteristics. The first set of assumptions to be examined relate to the
evaluator's role, the evaluator's relationship to the setting, and the validation basis
used to determine the adequacy of knowledge. In positivist evaluation, the
evaluator's role is that of an onlooker, or outsider (Legge, 1984). The researcher
views herself as detached and separate from the object under study, and valid
knowledge obtains when the evaluator accurately mirrors the objective reality of
the phenomena under study. Valid knowledge is obtained by accurately
measuring the phenomena under study, analyzing the resulting data for logical
patterns, and comparing empirical results with hypothesized relationships.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Underlying positivist evaluation's detachment of researcher from the object
under study are crucial epistemological assumptions: that there exists an
Figure 1
Characteristics of Positivist and Interpretive Evaluation
(adapted from Evered and Louis, 1981)
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objective reality consisting of facts that have a determinate nature or essence that
is knowable. Beginning with Popper (1972a, 1972b) however, philosophers of
social science have increasingly questioned the validity of viewing theory as
separate from observed phenomena (Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn 1970; Lakatos
1970). However, critics of positivism argue that, "observations are fallible
propositions which are theory-dependent and therefore cannot act as the neutral
arbitrator between competing theories" (Chua, 1986, p. 612). Habermas (1978)
refers to the assumption of a knowable, external world as the "objectivist illusion."
Banker and Kauffman's (1988) study of the impact of automated teller
machines (ATMs) on bank profitability illustrates positivist evaluation assumptions.
The evaluators were logically separated from the phenomena under study (i.e.,
the banks), and came to "know" the impact of ATMs on bank profitability by
collecting data from an external, knowable world. Data provided by the banks
themselves, from U.S. Census information, and from a private consulting firm
were seen as objective and independent of the theoretical propositions advanced.
Since data and theory were derived independently, the data consisting an
empirical validation of the "truth" of the theoretical propositions regarding the
impact of ATMs on bank profitability.
Interpretive evaluation views the evaluator's role, the evaluator's
relationship to the setting, and the basis of valid knowledge very differently. In
interpretive evaluation, the evaluator is also a participant in the evaluation
process. The researcher comes to know the "subject" by immersion and
involvement in the phenomena under study. Knowledge is validated not by
forming arbitrary distinctions between "theory" and "data", but by appeal to a
combination of logical consistency, subjective interpretation, and agreement with
actors' common-sense interpretation (Schutz, 1962).
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Underlying interpretive evaluation is a very different set of epistemological
assumptions: knowledge results from human experience, which is inherently
continuous and nonlogical, but which can be symbolically represented
(Heidegger, 1962). Because there exists no neutral, objective world of facts to act
as final arbitrator, evaluators must take seriously the social, subjective realities of
actors that emerge in human interaction. The hazard of such a perspective is that
no clear standards exist for judging the adequacy of an explanation (Bernstein,
1976; Habermas, 1978). As a consequence, the findings of the evaluation may be
distorted and contaminated by the values and beliefs of the evaluator. Bertram
Russell (1945) refers to the rejection of an objective, knowable world as the
"fallacy of subjectivism."
Mann and colleagues (Mann and Hoffman, 1960; Mann and Williams,
1960) study of the introduction of a transaction processing system (TPS) in a
power company illustrates interpretive evaluation. The investigators began
interviews with employees of the power company six years prior to introduction of
the new system, and collected data for the five years during which the system was
designed and implemented. The evaluators came to "know" the impact of the new
system through over 300 unstructured interviews with employees at a variety of
levels in the organization. Although the evaluators were not members of the
organization under study, by intense, sustained observation, awareness of
linguistic cues, and careful attention to detail, the investigators came to
understand what the new TPS "meant" to organizational actors.
The Banker and Kauffman, and Mann and colleague investigations also
reveal differences in paradigmatic assumptions regarding the sources of
analytical categories used to classify data collected during evaluations. In
positivist evaluation, investigators typically preselect categories used to classify
data, and then generate hypotheses or predictions from these categorizations.
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For example, Banker and Kauffman's (1988) assertion that ATMs can be used as
competitive weapons by banks evidences a priori classifications regarding how
the data will be analyzed. Only data relevant to these prespecified categorizations
were collected. Such prespecification contains the hazard that important results
will be omitted since they fall outside of preclassifications. At an extreme, a priori
classification can lead to evaluations that "discover" only what the evaluators
expect to discover (Weick, 1984), by providing data that are hopelessly biased by
the preconceptions of investigators.
In contrast, interpretive evaluations begins with observations rather than
theories. Salient features of the phenomena under study are uncovered through
the experiential process of exploring the social meanings and interactions of
organizational actors. Data and categories emerge simultaneously and
interactively as information is interpreted in light of shared understandings evident
in the language and ideology of the social system under scrutiny (Morgan and
Smircich, 1980). However, categorization in interpretive evaluation has been
criticized for being idiosyncratic and nongeneralizable beyond the particular
evaluative setting within which it arose. At an extreme, interpretive evaluation
yields information that is unusable beyond individual contexts (Legge, 1984).
Mann's study of computing illustrates an interpretive approach to
categorization. Theoretical propositions about the impact of the system emerged
from the data, rather than being a priori constructs to be validated by the data.
Conclusions are grounded in the specific circumstances found in the evaluative
setting explored by the evaluators. For example, significant changes in
procedures, job structure, and management attitudes were found to result from
the introduction of the TPS. These findings were not hypothesized, and are
presented as being dependent upon the complex, interrelated forces found in the
organizational environment surrounding the new system.
The Epistcmology of Evaluation
9
The differing modes of inquiry also result in fundamentally different types of
knowledge acquired. Positivist evaluation generates generalizable, universal
knowledge or theoria (Heidegger, 1962). Positivist evaluation seeks universal laws
or principles that can be used to explain, predict, and control events. Such
principles are evident in the Banker and Kauffman study. The use of a particular
ATM network is associated with positive market share (p. 145). Such a finding
provides general knowledge regarding the relationship between ATM networks
and profitability. The fact that positivist evaluation may show that such a
relationship is contingent upon other factors (e.g., effective marketing practices),
merely means that additional environmental preconditions are necessary for
predicting, explaining, and controlling events. Even when contingencies are
necessary to produce a predicted result, positivist evaluation approaches still
yield general, universal knowledge.
Interpretive evaluation generates knowledge that is relevant to particular
situations. Interpretive evaluation emphasizes understanding events, rather than
predicting and controlling them. Interpretive evaluation can be characterized as
seeking praxis knowledge, or the knowledge of how to act in particular situations
(Bernstein, 1971). Such knowledge cannot exist independent of an understanding
of human organizations. Mann and colleague's descriptions of implementing a
TPS does not generate generalizable knowledge about implementing TPSs, but
instead provides a detailed understanding of a particular implementation. Such
knowledge provides a highly accurate description as a result of the intense,
sustained involvement of the researchers. However, the description is of
questionable generalizability. In contrast, positivist evaluation produces
generalizable knowledge that is of questionable value in understanding particular
evaluative results and settings.
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Assumptions about the nature and meaning of data significantly differ
between evaluative paradigms. Positivist evaluation obtains generalizable
knowledge by stripping away what is peculiar to individual organizations to reveal
the kernel of presumed universal truth. Data are context-free: they have the same
meaning across organizational settings. Data are separated from context by a
quantitative evaluation language, that applies standardized sampling,
aggregation, and statistical analysis to strip away what is unique about
organizations and reveal what is general to them. Banker and Kauffman therefore
collect only data that are common to all banks studied, and intentionally ignore
particular circumstances within individual banks that might explain ATM prof-
itability or usefulness.
Interpretive evaluation views data as contextually embedded in the
complex fabric of political, social, and historical forces from which it emerges.
"Facts" cannot be logically separated from contexts, since the "meaning" of such
"facts" is dependent upon the shared understandings of organizational
participants. When the evaluator understands contexts and the nature of the
forces that have produced them, then real knowledge obtains. The evaluation
language in interpretive evaluation places the evaluator directly in the
organizational context, and emphasizes obtaining a qualitative understanding of
the perspectives of organizational participants. Mann's study illustrates the
interpretive view of contextually-embedded data and meaning. Mann spent eleven
years understanding and interpreting the complex, interdependent forces that
shaped computing in the power company under study. His data are qualitative
and designed to reveal the perspectives of individual organizational participants,
rather than to generate universal statements regarding the impact of computing
on organizations.
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III. PARADIGMATIC LINKAGES WITH EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
The evaluation paradigms described in section two logically link with CBIS
evaluation methodology. By first considering evaluation methodology in general,
the linkages are made more prominent, and the dominant methodologies are
more evident. Figure 2 (adapted from Douglas (1976) and Weick (1984)) can be
characterized as a continuum of evaluation methodologies that range from pure
immersion in natural experience to highly controlled observations. Although spe-
cific orderings are debatable, the forms of observation near the top and middle of
the list are less controlled and involve naturalistic, emergent inquiry. Forms of
observation near the bottom of the list are more controlled and involve methods of
observation that use a priori classification.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Low and high variety evaluation
One important characteristic of an evaluative methodology is its capacity
for environmental sensing or variety (Patton, 1987; Pondy, 1977). The law of
requisite variety states that, in order to accurately sense a system, the sensing
mechanism must be at least as complex as the system (Conant and Ashby,
1970). Stated differently, a sensing mechanism must contain variety in order to
register variety in a system under observation. For example, a photographer who
must separately photograph ten objects, each of which is a different distance from
the camera, must have a camera with at least ten distinct settings, if all of the pho-
tographs are to appear uniformly sharp (Weick, 1979). If the camera has fewer
than ten settings, then it possesses insufficient variety for the task.
Methods in the lower half of Figure 3 are of low variety, while those in the
upper half are of high variety. Low variety evaluation will detect, process, and
exhibit relatively less variety in CBIS, since the quantitative language of low variety
Figure 2
Continuum of Evaluative Methodologies
(Adapted from Douglas (1976) and Weick (1984))
Everyday Life/
Social Experience and Thought
1. Conscious Experience
2. Practical Thought and Action
3
.
Diaries and Memories
4. Travelogues
5. On-Site Field Studies and
Reports
6. Systematic Reflection
7. Philosophical Reflection
Field Research/
Participant Field Research
8. Depth-Probe Field Research
9. Investigative Reporting,
Detective Work
10. Covert Field Research
11. Overt Journalism and Police
Work
12 Overt Field Work
Nonparticipant Field Research 13. Discussion Research (free-
flowing)
, In-Depth Interviews
14. In-Depth Interviews with
Flexible Checklists of
Questions
Controlled Experimental Methods 15. Natural Experiments
16. Preprogrammed Interviews
(with statistical analysis)
17. Official Data and Business
Analysis Reports
18. Judicial Investigations
(operating under rules of
evidence)
19. Panel (test and retest) Studie
20. Laboratory Experiments
21. Questionnaires and Polls
22. Computer Simulation Studies
23. Mathematical and Statistical
Models
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methods contains a smaller pool of symbols than does the qualitative, "natural"
language of high variety evaluation (Daft and Wiginton, 1979; Patton, 1987;
Pondy, 1977). Low variety evaluation converts both the complex and the simple,
the ambiguous and the unambiguous into the exact, unequivocal languages of
statistics and mathematics. In contrast, high variety methodologies register rela-
tively more variety, since natural, qualitative language contains a larger pool of
symbols for expressing ideas. Natural language contains more words than any
person can or needs to understand and assimilate, resulting in countless possible
combinations for capturing the variety present in organizations.
Low variety methodologies offer precision as an alternative to variety
(Campbell, 1975). Low variety methods can be used to generate precise,
unequivocal statements about CBIS by using a small set of precisely-defined
symbols. For example, the definitions of a "t test" and "probability" are relatively
universal. In contrast, agreement on the correct method for determining the
meaning of CBIS "success" is ambiguous and dependent upon organizational
context. The quantitative languages of statistics and mathematics provide low
variety evaluation methodologies with precise symbols that are useful in
generating unambiguous descriptions of systems. In contrast, high variety
methods use less precise natural language as a medium of expression (Daft and
Wiginton, 1979).
Methods for evaluating CBIS do not exist independent of issues of
epistemology and ontology. Further, the choice of a method strongly influences
what is "found", since epistemological and ontological assumptions are
embedded in evaluation methods (Douglas, 1976). As a result, what researchers
"find" is strongly influenced by what they expect to find (Weick, 1984).
Consequently, positivist CBIS evaluators generally use low variety methods, since
they seek and expect universal, generalizable knowledge, while interpretive CBIS
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evaluators generally use high variety methods, since they seek and expect
particular, contextually-embedded knowledge.
Low variety methods provide positivist CBIS evaluators with
"preprogrammed" techniques designed to eliminate the biases of the investigator,
and to engender the assumed separation of observer and observed (Legge,
1984). The stronger control over observation present in low variety methods are
related to positivist assumptions regarding a priori classification of observations.
Low variety methods rely more on theoretical preconceptions of what is to be
observed, and less on observation (Douglas, 1976).
High variety methods provide interpretive CBIS evaluators with methods for
"natural" observation, intended to capture the experience of organizational actors.
Control over observations is lessened, since data are expected to "tell their own
story." This story will be pieced together by the researcher through ex post
classification and categorization. High variety methods therefore rely more on
observation and less upon theoretical preconceptions.
However, while methods are related to epistemological assumptions, they
do not map directly into assumptions. Evaluators can and do mix low variety
methodology categories with an interpretive perspective, and high variety
methods with positivist perspectives. For example, covert field work conducted by
an evaluator working within a positivist paradigm might be used to count the
number and length of interactions between a systems analyst and a system user.
The same method used within an interpretive paradigm could be used to explore
the subjective meanings shared by analyst and user. Thus, while associations
between paradigms and methodologies are found, there does not exist a one-to-
one mapping of paradigms into methods.
The Epistemology of Evaluation
14
IV. CBIS EVALUATION METHODS
Examining the CBIS evaluation literature in light of evaluative epistemology
and methodological variety provides insight into the assumptions and strategies
that dominant CBIS evaluation. While it is not the intent of this article to
exhaustively review the CBIS evaluation literature, examining selected examples
of CBIS evaluation illustrates both common and unusual CBIS evaluation
approaches and provides insight into improving CBIS evaluation.
Low Variety Methods
The most common approach to CBIS evaluative is to combine low variety
methods with a positivist paradigm. Most user surveys (e.g., Franz, Robey, and
Koeblitz, 1986; Rushinek and Rushinek, 1983; Srinivasan; 1985), measures of
computer usage (Ferrari, 1978; Hiltz and Turoff, 1981), and other uses of external,
"objective" data sources (e.g., Banker and Kauffman, 1988; Laudon, 1986) to
evaluate computing activities combine low variety methods with positivist
assumptions. Sprague and Carlson (1982) explicitly argue for a positivist
paradigm, survey sampling approach to evaluating decision support systems.
One striking feature of low variety, positivist evaluation is the relative
absence of measures of what people do with systems as opposed to what they
say they do. While exceptions do exist (e.g, Banker and Kauffman, 1988; Laudon,
1986), the majority of low variety CBIS evaluation relies upon self-reports of
systems usage and usefulness, rather than measures of system usage and
usefulness. The organizational and political contexts within which systems are im-
plemented provide strong motivations for organizational actors to appear highly
rational, satisfied, and consistent in their relationships with organizational CBIS
(Feldman and March, 1981; Kling, 1987). Direct measures of systems usage are
therefore less likely to be biased towards appearances of rationality than are self
reports of system usage.
The Epistemology of Evaluation
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Combining low variety methods and an interpretive paradigm is unusual,
since interpretive perspectives generally assume complexities in computing
relationships not captured by low variety methods. However, Robertson (in press)
illustrates a low variety method/interpretive paradigm approach to evaluating
systems usage in a management consulting firm. Robertson's theory of systems
impact is strongly interpretive. Information systems are socially determined, and
are dependent upon the shared meanings of subgroups of organizational actors.
However, Robertson uses structured self-reports of relationships between
organizational actors, and sophisticated statistical methodology to analyze rela-
tionships between organizational actors. Results suggest partial support for
hypothesized relationship between social interpretations of systems §nd
organizational subgroup.
Kling (1987) cautions researchers against exclusive use of low variety
methods within an interpretive perspective. Kling argues that low variety methods,
such as standardized surveys, can only be effectively combined with interpretive
perspectives when high variety methods have been previously used to delineate
important computing relationships in an organization. Kling argues that low variety
methods do not provide sufficient variety to capture the subtleties and
complexities that interpretive researchers assume exist in and around computing
relationships in organizations.
High Variety Methods
While less frequent, high variety methods are employed to evaluate CBIS.
Examples of depth-probe or longitudinal field research combined with an
interpretive paradigm include Mann and Williams (1960), Boland and Day (in
press), and Barley (1986). Boland and Day (in press) illustrate interpretive
evaluation using high variety methods from the upper end of Figure 2. They
conducted interviews with one credit union systems analyst over a two year
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period. The first year's interviews were conducted while the analyst worked on a
new loan application system, while the second year's interviews consist of the
analyst's reflections about the previous year's systems design experience. These
interviews reveal that systems design may require more moral, ethical choices by
systems analysts than is generally recognized. For example, the systems analyst
was asked to design an easy-to-use system to allow poorly paid workers to re-
place higher pay, higher talent workers.
Articles suggesting CBIS evaluation strategies for IS practitioners
frequently reflect a high variety / positivist perspective to evaluation (e.g., Burch
and Grudnitski 1986). For example, Keen (1975, 1981) argues that consideration
of qualitative benefits should be the most important consideration in evaluating
systems and that high variety methods are appropriate for evaluating such
benefits. However, Keen argues for high variety methods within a framework of
positivist assumptions that include detachment between evaluator and evaluation,
a priori specification of "success" and of system goals, and objective analysis of
data. Existing evidence suggests that, while high variety/positivist perspectives
for CBIS evaluation are frequently recommended in the IS literature, they are
seldom applied by their assumed constituency of IS practitioners (Hogue and
Watson, 1984; Sprague and Carlson, 1982). One explanation for the apparent
lack of interest in high variety/positivist approaches to evaluation may be that IS
professionals do not share the epistemological convictions of the positivist
research paradigm. For example, IS professionals may be unconcerned with
obtaining controlled, objective observations, that are mediated by a priori
classification.
"Mixed" Methods
Geertz (1983) has observed that once-distinct boundaries between social
science disciplines are increasingly blurred, and that mixing of methods and
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perspectives is emerging as a dominant research trend. This mixing of methods
and perspectives is reflected in the increasing use of mixed methods and mixed
paradigms in CBIS evaluation. "Mixed" CBIS evaluations have combined a variety
of methodologies including questionnaires, financial and budgetary data analysis,
unstructured interviews, examination of documents and memoranda,
observations at meetings, and tape recordings to understand systems impact.
The mixing of high and low variety methodologies is frequently combined with a
mixing of paradigms, leading to explorations of the implications of contrasting
paradigmatic assumptions. Two recent examples illustrate mixing paradigmatic
assumptions and evaluation methods.
Franz and Robey (1984) studied the impact of an automobile insurance
company information system over a 22 month period, using a combination of
open-ended interviews, questionnaires, examination of critical incident files, formal
documents, and observations at meetings. Their paradigmatic perspective is
largely interpretive, but also involves exploring the extent to which positivist
theories can explain observed systems development behavior. Their theoretical
perspective compares and contrasts rational and political explanations for
observed systems design behavior. Both quantitative and qualitative data is
gathered to motivate and interpret theoretical propositions.
Kaplan and Duchon (1988) combined low and high variety methodologies
to evaluate the impact of a new computerized data management in a medical
laboratory. Methods employed include open-ended interviews, sustained
observation, and surveys. Both quantitative and qualitative data analyses were
used to evaluate systems impact and success, and both interpretive and positivist
assumptions are explicated, discussed, and evaluated. Based upon their
combined qualitative and quantitative data analyses, Kaplan and Duchon propose
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a largely interpretive model to explain changes in job characteristics and work
relationships resulting from computerization.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CBIS EVALUATION
Viewing CBIS evaluation within the framework of paradigmatic
assumptions and evaluation methodology suggests several implications for
improving CBIS evaluation. In particular, four propositions emerge. These
observations pertain to recognizing implicit values, beliefs, and assumptions,
acknowledging trade offs, building complicated descriptions of CBIS, and using
positivist and interpretive evaluation as interdependent, not competing, modes of
inquiry.
Proposition #1 - CBIS evaluations always contain implicit assumptions,
values, and beliefs.
Any evaluation of a CBIS contains the implicit values, beliefs, and
assumptions of the evaluator. Positivist evaluators believe in separation of
researcher and subject, the importance of objective, generalizable knowledge,
and quantitative methodologies. Interpretive evaluators belief in immersing the
researcher in the subject, the importance of particular, subjective knowledge, and
qualitative methodologies. While positivist assumptions can be mixed with inter-
pretive assumptions, assumptions, values, and beliefs cannot be eliminated from
the process of CBIS evaluation.
However hidden, implicit assumptions cannot be argued, debated, or
scrutinized. Consequently, effective presentation of CBIS evaluation research
requires explicitly recognizing and acknowledging one's assumptions, values,
and beliefs. Ultimately, the issue is not whether or not researchers bring values,
assumptions and beliefs to CBIS evaluation, but whether these values,
assumptions, and beliefs are defenselessly recognized, acknowledged, and dis-
cussed.
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Proposition #2 - CBIS evaluators always make trade offs.
The choice of an evaluation method or perspective always involves trade
offs. To see this, consider Thorngate's postulate of commensurate complexity
(Thorngate, 1976; Weick, 1979, 1984) . Thorngate observes that it is impossible to
generate explanations of behavior that are simultaneously general , accurate , and
simple . At best, two of the three objectives can be met. Movement toward any two
objectives is movement away from the third. Therefore, as a theory moves
towards greater generality and simplicity, it necessarily becomes less able to
predict specific behavior (i.e., less accurate). As a theory moves towards greater
accuracy and simplicity, it becomes less able to describe behavior in general. And
as a theory becomes more general and accurate, it loses simplicity.
The implication of Thorngate's postulate for CBIS evaluators is that the
choice of a method and perspective in evaluating a CBIS is a forced trade off
between the competing goals of accuracy, generality, and simplicity. While CBIS
evaluators may differ as to which goals are of greater importance, trade offs are
inevitable. Consciously acknowledging these trade offs, and openly discussing
the value of alternative combinations of goals is likely to lead to an improved
understanding of the merits of alternative perspectives and approaches to CBIS
evaluation.
Proposition #3 - 'Complicated' evaluations of CBIS are likely to be more
accurate.
Boulding (1956) and Pondy and Mitroff (1978) have observed that human
organizations are among the most complex of known systems. Effectively
evaluating CBIS requires understanding the relationship between computing
technology and complex, on-going human organizations. Recent approaches to
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CBIS evaluation attempt to understand and describe the complexity of human
organizations by using multiple evaluation methods, and by mixing assumptions
from positivist approaches with those of interpretive approaches. Such ap-
proaches are designed to reflect the complexity of human organizations by
providing "complicated descriptions" (Weick, 1979) of the impact of computing
technology on organizations.
Triangulating evaluation methods provides one means of generating
complicated descriptions of systems. Triangulation involves combining high and
low variety methodologies to study a phenomena (Denzin, 1978). Researchers
using multiple methods can be more confident in their findings, are more likely to
discover unusual or unexpected phenomena, and can more effectively synthesize
and integrate disparate theories or paradigms (Jick, 1979). However, the use of
multiple measures is not a sufficient condition for achieving triangulation in
measurement (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and Sechrest, 1966). For example, the
use of multiple survey questions regarding user satisfaction does little to achieve
measurement triangulate, since such measures are largely redundant (Rushinek
and Rushinek, 1983). Rather, triangulating measurement requires choosing low
and high variety methods from Figure 1.
An alternative approach to generating "complicated descriptions" is to
triangulate theory. Achieving theoretical triangulation requires holding conflicting
assumptions regarding the impact of a CBIS. Simultaneously trusting and
doubting the same assumption achieves a theoretical triangulation that can be
matched with methodological triangulation. As Weick observes:
Any person who has a view of the world and who also discredits
part of that view winds up with two ways to examine a situation.
Discrediting is a way to enhance requisite variety and a way to reg-
ister more of the varietv that's present in the world (Weick, 1979, p.
228).
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Two methods exist for generating and holding conflicting assumptions and
theoretical perspectives. One is to triangulate investigators by creating a multi-
perspective team with differing ontological and epistemological assumptions
(Denzin, 1978; Legge, 1984). Such an approach to triangulation is used by Kaplan
and Duchon in their investigation of computing in a medical laboratory.
Alternatively, CBIS evaluators can make themselves more "complicated," by con-
sciously generating and explicating alternative, conflicting theoretical perspectives
(Bartunek, Gordon, and Weathersby, 1983; Streufert and Swezey, 1986). Using
either approach to achieving theoretical triangulation increases the likelihood of
producing accurate descriptions of the effects of CBIS evaluation and reduces the
chance that evaluators will "see" only what they expect to see.
Proposition #4 - Interpretive and positivist evaluation are interdependent,
not competing, modes of inquiry.
Positivist and interpretive approaches to science are often viewed as
competing, unreconcilable paradigms for conducting research (e.g., Chua 1986;
Legge, 1984). However, achieving theoretical triangulation in evaluation requires
viewing interpretive and positivist approaches not as competing, but as
complementary modes of inquiry (Johnson, 1989). In conducting "complicated"
evaluation, evaluators focus exclusive attention on interpretive and positivist
paradigms only temporarily, and move between paradigms in order to generate
more accurate descriptions.
Why might cycling between interpretive and positivist evaluation lead to
more accurate descriptions of the effects of CBISs? One explanation for the
effectiveness of interdependent, concurrent modes of inquiry may be that such
approaches reflect a "natural" division of responsibility in the brain. Research
suggests that the left and right brain hemispheres of humans utilize distinct
approaches to acquiring information about the world (Meyer, 1985; Simon, 1977;
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Taggert and Robey 1981). Levy summarizes the considerable research with
subjects whose brain hemispheres have been separated as follows:
Each side of the brain is able to perform and chooses to perform a
certain set of cognitive tasks which the other side finds difficult or
distasteful or both... The right hemisphere synthesizes over space.
The left hemisphere analyzes over time. The right hemisphere notes
visual similarities to the exclusion of conceptual similarities. The left
hemisphere does the opposite. The right hemisphere perceives
form, the left hemisphere, detail. The right hemisphere codes
sensory input in terms of images, the left hemisphere in terms of
linguistic descriptions. The right hemisphere lacks a phonological
analyzer; the left hemisphere lacks a Gestalt svnthesizer (Levy,
1974, p. 167).
Moving between interpretive and positivist assumptions in CBIS evaluation
may generate more accurate descriptions of organizational phenomena because
brain physiology loosely corresponds to the alternative modes of inquiry found in
interpretive and positivist approaches to evaluation. The right brain hemisphere is
concerned with experiential, impressionistic understanding, while the left is
concerned with logic and analysis. Similar observations can be made with respect
to the processes of knowledge acquisition used in interpretive and positivist
modes of inquiry. Interpretive inquiry largely relies on experiential approaches to
acquiring knowledge while positivist inquiry relies on analytical, logical
approaches.
VI. CONCLUSION
Banville and Landry (1989), building on the work of Whitley (1984) have
recently described the MIS research field as a "fragmented adhocracy,"
characterized by: (1) distinct, independent schools of thought, (2) little stan-
dardization as to methods and measures, (3) problems of broad scope that defy
standardization. Culnan's co-citation analysis of MIS research supports the view
of MIS as a multiparadigmatic discipline. She identifies nine subfields of MIS in
one study (Culnan, 1986) and five in a subsequent one (Culnan and Swanson,
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1987). Banville and Landry suggest that fruitful inquiry in a fragmented adhocracy
is fueled by applying multiple perspectives and methods to complex, ill-defined
problems.
The CBIS evaluation literature reflects the "fragmented adhocracy"
characteristics of the more general MIS literature. The CBIS evaluation literature
shows distinct schools of thought (e.g., positivist and interpretive), little agreement
as to appropriate methods and measures (e.g., high and low variety), and a
concern with tackling broad, encompassing problems that defy standardized
formulation (e.g., the value of CBIS). The existence of a "fragmented adhocracy"
in CBIS evaluation suggests that disparate approaches will be used to evaluate
CBIS. However generating productive, consequential scholarship requires
sufficient cohesion among investigators that research findings can be shared and
understood (Weick, 1983).
One key element of cohesion that can be built into CBIS evaluation is
shared understanding of the values, assumptions, and beliefs implicit in
alternative approaches to CBIS evaluation. The plurality of perspectives within
MIS insures that CBIS evaluation will be examined from a variety of perspectives.
However, effectively discerning the relative contributions of individual research
efforts requires understanding alternative epistemological assumptions and
limitations. By defenselessly explicating and discussing these underlying
assumptions, CBIS evaluators can understand one another more clearly, thereby
increasing the likelihood of improving our understanding of the impact of systems
on organizations, and of organizations on systems.
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